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Based on Ordered-Probit models, I estimate the monetary policy reaction function of the 
European Central Bank between 2001 and 2019. Results show that the ECB does display a 
forward-looking behaviour. Inflation and output growth projections play a significant role in 
their monetary policy decisions. Moreover, yield spreads across euro area countries do not seem 
to be significant on their decision. Therefore, the possibility of a secondary mandate related to 
financial markets’ stability is not confirmed, according to my results. Lastly, marginal effects 
on the ordered-probit regressions, show that forecasts on output growth have the largest weight 
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1. Introduction 
Earlier this year, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced a revision of its long-term 
monetary policy strategy. Ever since the Sovereign Debt Crisis, its ability to fulfil the mandate 
of price stability has been questioned, given the consistently failed approaches of bringing 
inflation below, but close to two percent. The unconventional programmes, albeit being key in 
guaranteeing the stability of financial markets, have not been successful in reaching the target. 
Curdia and Woodford (2010) questioned the true goal of credit policy in the US. Whether it is 
a substitute for interest-rate policy, or a non-standard measure with a different purpose than that 
of interest-rate policy. The same could be asked about the Assets Purchase Programmes (APP) 
in the euro area (EA). Are they aiming at a different mandate?  
In this research I further explore the ECB’s empirical reaction function using an Ordered-Probit 
model, as suggested by Eichengreen et al. (1985), Gerlach (2007), and Gerlach and Lewis 
(2014). For 19 years, in a total of 208 meetings, only 50 changes to the monetary policy took 
place, including interest rate changes and the implementation of unconventional measures. 
Since the ECB takes the decision of not changing rates more often than not, and for quite 
discrete amounts, it would be questionable to use a continuous function to describe monetary 
policy actions.  
Besides that, since the Great Financial Crisis the ECB has broadened its toolkit, adopting 
unconventional measures such as the above-mentioned APP, a large “quantitative easing” 
program consisting of net purchases of corporate and government debt securities, Forward 
Guidance on interest rates and asset purchases, and several bank liquidity provision programs 
such as the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO). Since there is not a 
commonly accepted approach of converting these programmes into shadow rates, and both 
conventional and unconventional policy measures must be accounted for (Orphanides 2010), I 
focus my attention on the directional changes of monetary policy decisions.  
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Regarding the determinants of the empirical reaction function, research has shown that ECB’s 
monetary policy decisions are forward-looking (Orphanides 2001). For instance, Gorter et al. 
(2010) compared two models. The traditional one proposed by Taylor, which recurs to past 
records of inflation and output, and a new approach, which includes, expected inflation and 
expected output growth. Results show that the coefficient of inflation in the more conventional 
model was not significantly different from zero, contrasting with the significance found in the 
model which included expectations.  
I follow Gorter et al. (2010) approach, and compare the significance of inflation and output 
projections at different time-horizons and their effects on monetary policy actions. Since the 
ECB releases quarterly projections for inflation and output growth for four- and eight-quarters 
ahead, it is important to understand which forecasts matter the most in ECB’s decisions.  
In my research I also include a measure of financial integration in the euro area. Baele et al. 
(2004) defined that a market is financially integrated if all potential market participants, with 
the same relevant features, have equal access to the market, face the same set of rules, and are 
treated equally when they are active in the market. In a fully integrated market, there should 
not be any discrimination based solely on the location of origin. If economic agents in a 
monetary union do not have the same kind of credit access this can hamper central banks 
effectiveness in conducting an appropriate monetary policy. Therefore, financial integration is 
key to deliver the ECB’s mandate of price stability.  
While the ECB has been quite successful in promoting financial integration, and guaranteeing 
low spreads through EA countries, by more than doubling its balance sheet size, it has been less 
fortunate in achieving the two-percent inflation target. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether 
the ECB has a dual mandate concerning the stability of financial markets.   
On the other hand, staff projections do not reflect these failed efforts of reaching the two-
percent inflation target. Actually, ECB forecasts tend to overpredict inflation for several 
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quarters, since the Sovereign Debt Crisis. These mistakes may be the result of inconsistent 
forecasting models, and could potentially undermine the credibility of the Bank if not corrected. 
In section 3, I provide a brief descriptive analysis on the historical behaviour of ECB’s 
forecasting errors. Additionally, I compare its performance with that of other Central Banks.  
Could Central Banks (CBs) forecasting errors be related to their mandates? Do CBs with a 
single mandate tend to be more optimistic on their expectations? Also, are these forecasting 
errors suggestive of inflation holding the largest weight in ECB’s monetary policy decisions? 
Finally, does the ECB have a second mandate related to financial markets’ stability? Or are 
unconventional instruments aiming solely at price stability?    
My results do not support the hypothesis of a dual mandate. Coefficients on yield spreads 
provide no significant evidence encouraging the idea of ECB having a second mandate related 
to the fragmentation of the euro area. Such result may be the consequence of ECB having been 
reluctant in turbulent situations involving events in specific countries, such as Portugal and 
Italy, and not having been reluctant in others.  
Additionally, I do confirm that Central Banks with a single mandate tend to be more optimistic 
regarding inflation projections. However, this stubbornly tendency for ECB’s inflation 
projections to be always below, but close to the the two-percent target at some horizon does not 
mean that inflation holds the largest weight in monetary policy decisions. For instance, GDP 
growth projections at eight-quarters time do indeed accommodate the largest weight in ECB’s 
decisions.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the historic behaviour of ECB’s forecasting errors, and provides a 
comparison with other major CBs. Section 4 explains the data used and the methodology of the 
ordered probit model, which is implemented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Literature Review  
I follow Taylor (1999) in defining a monetary policy rule as a description of how the 
instruments of policy, such as the deposit facility rate (DFR), change in response to economic 
variables.  
According to Taylor (1993), the short-term interest rate set by the Central Bank changes in the 
face of deviations of inflation from the target and the level of output relative to the trend (output 
gap).  
However, as suggested by Eichengreen et al. (1985), Gerlach (2007), and Gerlach and Lewis 
(2014), since the interest rate remains unchanged for most of the time, and rates are often set at 
multiples of 25 basis points, it may be inappropriate to fit the model using OLS. Interest-rate 
setting follows a smoothing process, which reduces the need for consecutive changes across 
quarters (Gerlach 2007). 
As the interest rate stands in negative territory since 2014, and is no longer the only monetary 
policy instrument used, it wouldn’t be reasonable to evaluate the decisions of the ECB on the 
basis of the Taylor rule. Suggestions have been made in the sense of using a “shadow short 
rate” in order to quantify the monetary policy stance when interest rates reach the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) (Krippner 2012).  
Wu and Xia (2019) proposed a Taylor rule using shadow rates (SRTR) for the Federal Reserve. 
The shadow rate would behave similarly to the short-term interest rate when the economy is 
above the ZLB, and, once the economy hits the ZLB, the shadow rate acts like a summary 
statistic for unconventional monetary policy. Their results indicate that the SRTR seems to be 
a good description of what actual happens, including the ZLB period.  
McCoy and Clemens (2017) also conducted an analogous experience for the euro area. Their 
conclusions are less encouraging. Although they find shadow rates a useful indicator of the 
monetary policy stance, they believe that there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding such measure. 
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For instance, estimation results may differ significantly depending on the number of variables 
included in the model and the assumed or endogenously estimated lower bound.   
This paper extends the literature on empirical reaction functions for the euro area by using an 
Ordered-Probit model, in which easing may either reflect a downward change in the interest 
rate or the introduction of a non-standard monetary instrument. More recently, Cour-Thimann 
and Jung (2020) also used this approach, and concluded that their Ordered-Probit reaction 
functions match closely the policy-makers’ response over the last twenty years including the 
financial crisis episode. In their research, the introduction of an APP would be analogous to a 
25 basis points decrease of the interest rate. Such an approach introduces a large arbitrariness 
into the process, and ultimately underestimates the impact of different programmes in the 
economy. There is certainly a perceived difference between the introduction of the first Covered 
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) which amounted to 60 billion euros, and the second CBPP 
which added up to 16 billion euros.  
According to their empirical study, the ECB’s APP delivered a greater boost to the economy 
than interest rate cuts would have achieved alone. However, there is no commonly accepted 
model/method to quantitatively compare policy rate changes and quantitative easing policies. 
As such, in this work I assess the central bank reaction function solely on the basis of the 
directional change of policy: tightening, no change, or easing, where in each case both 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures are considered. For example, an 
episode of policy “easing” could stand not only for a decrease of the interest rate, but also for 






3. Inflation & Forecasting Errors  
ECB’s projections for the last six years have been somewhat misguiding. Although the ECB 
has been having trouble in reaching the two percent inflation target, its projections indicate the 
exact opposite. Their forecasts have consecutively overpredicted inflation, suggesting two 
things. First, that the ECB has been solely focused on inflation, and, second, that it has been 
successful in fulfilling its single mandate of price stability.  
In this section, I approach this latter consideration, providing a brief description of the historical 
record of ECB’s macroeconomic projections. Additionally, I compare them with other four 
Central Banks’ performances. A more exhaustive analysis on the ECB’s performance was 
conducted recently, so I am only focusing on a more descriptive and qualitative evaluation.  
For instance, Kontogeorgos and Lambrias (2019) assessed the ECB’s projection errors between 
2001 and 2016, by looking at criteria of optimality and rationality. Their results suggest that no 
significant bias has been found in the inflation projection, i.e. there is no persistent tendency to 
make errors in one direction. However, they also find that inflation bias has been steadily 
decreasing over time. In the first few years of monetary union, staff projections consistently 
underpredicted inflation. It was only after the Great Financial Crisis that this tendency was 
reversed, and forecasts started to persistently overpredict inflation. According to their results, 
the two periods cancel out each other, not resulting in a significant overall bias.   
My hypothesis is that, following the Sovereign Debt Crisis, Central Banks’ projections tend to 
be influenced by their mandate. A Central Bank that has a single mandate of price stability, like 
the European Central Bank2, tends to present more optimistic projections, given its urge in 
																																																						
2 “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability”, the Eurosystem shall also “support the general 
economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union.” 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 127(1), 2012).  
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showing results. Whether a  Central Bank with a dual mandate, like the Federal Reserve3, may 
not show, in its projections, the same urgency in reaching the target in the medium-term. 
The figure4 below (figure 1) perfectly illustrates how the ECB has stubbornly predicted a rise 
of core inflation at least since December 2013, the first time that core inflation forecasts were 











Data were collected for the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, the Swiss National 
Bank, the Risksbank, and the Bank of Canada, between 2001 and 2019.  
In the early 2000s, every Central Bank publicly announced, in a quarterly-basis, its projections 
for that year’s inflation (four-quarters ahead), and next year’s inflation (eight-quarters ahead). 
Only later did Central Banks start to publicly present projections for inflation in two years’ time 
(twelve-quarters ahead). Projections were majorly displayed in ranges, given their uncertainty, 
therefore I choose the average value of the range.  
																																																						
3 “The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from 
the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” 
(Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, 2020). 
4 Actual data is the bright red line, while the remaining colorful lines show the ECB forecasts made in each 
quarter.  
Figure 1 - ECB staff macroeconomic projections for euro-area core inflation 
(moving 12 months average rate of change) 
Source: Bruegel 
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I am not particularly interested in evaluating the forecasting error in four-quarters time, since 
Central Banks have little room for manoeuvre in those projections. But, the eight- and twelve-
quarters time forecasts can easily involve judgment, and be used to anchor consumers’ 
expectations, contributing to the effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price stability.  
According to a 2016 survey, ECB projections are taken into account by professional forecasters, 
as they provide benchmarks for their short- and medium-term inflation expectations. This 
would suggest that the ECB might have not only the motive, but also the means to influence 
agents’ expectations by producing biased forecasts.  
The following equation decomposes the Central Banks’ forecasting error into two terms: 
 
𝐹𝐸 = 𝜋% − 𝜋∗ − (𝜋%
) − 𝜋∗)	
	
πt stands for realized inflation in period t, π* stands for the Central Bank’s target inflation, and 
𝜋%
)	stands for the 8-quarters ahead projection for quarter t.  
My hypothesis is that the first term, specially in the last six years, will tend to be large for banks 
with a single mandate of price stability, given their consistent but unsuccessful measures in 
bringing up inflation. And the second term will be much smaller, given their projections always 
being very optimistic and close to the two-percent target. On the contrary, for banks with a dual 
mandate, the first term will not be as large, nor the second will be as small.  
Below, figures 2 and 3 outlay the historical behaviour of forecasting errors, for the eight-
quarters horizon, for the United States and the euro area. The figures for the remaining three 
Central Banks can be found in the appendix.  
The series in orange (series 2) correspond to the first term in the forecasting error equation 
decomposition, and the grey series (series 3) correspond to the second term. The blue marker 
























For the past six years, just like expected, the grey series in the ECB’s graph is much larger than 
in the Fed’s graph. This corroborates with my hypothesis of, given ECB’s mandate, their 
forecasts seem somewhat biased. The orange series, for the last six years, confirms ECB’s 
continuous, but failed approaches of getting inflation closer to the two percent target.  
Figure 2 - Forecasting Error Decomposition (United States), 2001-19 
Figure 3 - Forecasting Error Decomposition (euro area), 2001-19 
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Swiss National Bank’s primary objective is price stability while taking due account of economic 
developments. Even though their mandate is quite similar to the ECB’s one, the graph does not 
outline the same behaviour. Their projections largely outweigh their own long-term target. The 
reason I find that might explain this phenomenon is their flexible inflation targeting for the 
short- and medium-term. Since 2007, they have adopted a more flexible interpretation of their 
mandate, while keeping their long-term nominal anchor – the two percent target. Their goal is 
not to have a two percent inflation every year, but rather an average of two percent over the 
years, allowing inflation to be above two percent in one year, and below two percent in the 
following.  
The Swedish and Canadian National Banks, having a single mandate of price stability, do 
corroborate my hypothesis, with graphs showing quite similar patterns to the European one.  
Does this consistently positive bias in ECB’s projections indicate that inflation gets the largest 
weight in its reaction function? Before moving to the next sections, on the monetary policy 
reaction function of the ECB, and answering this last question, I would like to add a remark on 
the discussion about forecasting errors.  
Forecasts provide a guidance for what is expected to happen in the economy, and what risks 
does the economy expects to face in the future. Based on these forecasts, individuals and firms 
make informed decisions. The link between individual decision making and forecasts is key for 
the exercise of monetary policy. However, forecasts can only be informative, if they are 
accurate. As such, persistent forecasting failures could potentially undermine ECB’s credibility. 
This makes it preponderant to have a discussion on the ECB’s mandate and its strategy, as it 






4. Data & Methodology 
 
The next section discusses the sources and characteristics of the data used, as well as the 
methodology followed.  
I gather quarterly observations for inflation forecasts, GDP growth forecasts, and yields on 10-
year government bonds for five European countries, between 2001 and 2019.  
Since 2015, the decision to raise, lower or leave the interest rate unchanged is made every six 
weeks. Before that, the Governing Council took decisions on monetary policy on a monthly 
basis. Given that staff projections are available every quarter I evaluate ECB’s decisions on a 
quarterly basis. For instance, if the ECB decides to ease its monetary policy stance on January 
of a given year, that shows up as an ‘easing’ on the first quarter of that same year. Rarely are 
multiple policy changes made within the same quarter, and even in those cases, 98% of 
decisions in the same quarter go in the same direction. As such the use of quarterly data does 
not undermine the analysis.  
The first Assets Purchase Programme was introduced in 2009. From then onwards, six more 
programmes have been implemented. From these, two have already been terminated, and the 
four remaining ones restarted purchases in the end of 2019. The introduction of a programme 
is assumed as an “easing” of the monetary policy stance, and the end of a programme, a 
“tightening” of the monetary policy stance. In the case of restarting purchases under a 
programme, the assumption is analogous to the introduction of such programme. Also, I include 
the date from which forward guidance started. I assume the latter as a monetary policy 
loosening.  
Regarding the interest rates, the ECB makes its call on three different rates: the rate on the main 
refinancing operations (MRO), the rate on the deposit facility (DFR) and the rate on the 
marginal lending facility. I decided to focus my attention on the rate that moved closer to the 
EONIA rate. As the ECB states “the EONIA rate is the starting point for the transmission 
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mechanism” and “the money market functioning is paramount for monetary policy”. In figure 
8, on the appendix, I present the path of all four rates. As it stands out, until the 9th of October 
of 2008, the EONIA rate stands closely to the MRO, such that I chose the MRO as the interest 
rate for the first eight years of my sample. After that point, the EONIA starts moving closer to 
the deposit facility rate (DFR) in a context of excess liquidity. So, for the remaining years of 
my sample I used the DFR as the interest rate set by the ECB.  
Both inflation and GDP growth forecasts were extracted from ECB quarterly communications, 
released every March, June, September and December. I include projections for four- and eight-
quarters ahead, given that the twelve-quarters ahead projection was not disclosed between 
2001-2004, except for December. From the several inflation metrics, I choose headline inflation 
which constitutes the official inflation target.  
Regarding inflation, I include the deviation of the four- and eight-quarters projections from the 
target (∆𝜋%-.
) 	and ∆𝜋%-/
) , respectively). Given that the ECB has set a clear target in the past, my 
hypothesis is that when the 8-quarters projection significantly deviates from the 2-percent 
target, the ECB will tend to change its policy direction in order to accommodate that scenario.  
I do not expect the 4-quarters deviation to be significant in the ECB’s decision, given that 
headline inflation is subject to a lot of volatility from the inclusion of items such as energy and 
food in that measure. Therefore, it would not be sensible to have the ECB acting to every short-
term deviation from the target.  
In what concerns output, there is no clear target set. There are different ways to derive potential 
output, and estimates can differ depending on how they are derived. As such, I include the 
difference between projections of consecutive quarters (∆𝑦%-.
)  and ∆𝑦%-/
) ), and not the 
difference between the projection and a specific target. I expect the 8-quarters projection to be 
quite significant. If projections deteriorate, the ECB will tend to change the direction of its 
policy, easing the monetary policy stance, in order to accommodate such expectations.  
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Endogeneity concerns may arise when explaining policy rates by projected variables. For 
instance, the shocks that affect GDP growth projections are not perfectly exogenous, and may 
affect monetary policy as well. In past research, this issue has been fixed by the use of 
instrumental variables, such as various lags of past inflation. Although this approach might 
mitigate possible endogeneity concerns, it will not fix the problem. In my research, this issue 
is resolved by the use of forward-looking variables, which are subject to real-time uncertainty 
about the future interest rate path. Such method attenuates greatly endogeneity concerns 
(Orphanides 2001).  
I use yield spreads (𝑦𝑠%) in order to gauge the integration of the euro area (EA). Data on the 
10-year government bonds of Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain were extracted from 
the ECB’s statistical data warehouse, on a quarterly time basis.  
German bonds are perceived as a safe asset. Some papers such as Haugh et al. (2009) do indeed 
use the Bund yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate. The remaining four countries represent that 
group of countries most affected by the Sovereign Debt Crisis, given their fiscal imbalances. 
As such, I create an artificial yield which equals the weighted average of the 10-year 
government bond yields of these four countries, according to each country’s GDP.  











Lastly, I include one more variable in my model: the lagged directional change of the monetary 
policy choice (𝓏%34).  
Previous papers on the Central Bank’s reaction function included both the lagged level of the 
short-term interest rate, and the lagged change of the interest rate (Carstensen 2006, Cour-
Thimann and Jung 2020). The choice of these two variables derived from the smoothing 
behaviour that Central Banks adopt when choosing interest rates. Woodford (2003) claimed 
that such behaviour aimed not to disturb the markets.  
However, since my research also includes unconventional measures it is more sensible to 
include the lagged directional change of monetary policy decisions. This way, I am better able 
to cast the smoothing process of monetary policy. Just like interest rates, unconventional 
instruments also seem to follow a smoothing process. Purchasing programmes usually last for 
more than four quarters, and, even when terminated, the CB reinvests its principals in the 
following quarters.  






) , 𝑦𝑠%, 𝓏%34) 
 
This model outlays three possible directions that the monetary policy decision can take: 
“easing”, “no change”, and “tightening”. Accordingly, I define a random variable zt as follows5:  
 
𝔃𝒕 = 𝟏			if	𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈	 
𝔃𝒕 = 𝟐			if	𝒏𝒐	𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 
𝔃𝒕 = 𝟑			if	𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 
 
																																																						
5 “In general, the aforementioned assignment of integer values to the categories is rather arbitrary. It is 
usually made as a matter of convenience, and it should be clear that such an assignment is not unique.” 
(Moysiadis and Fokianos (2014)).	
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where 𝓏% stands for the directional change of monetary policy, which may reflect an upward 
change of the interest rate, or the introduction of an APP. In the ordered-probit model, the 
probability of 𝑧% = 1, 2	or	3 conditional on 𝑋% is defined using the normal cumulative 






) +	𝜌R𝑦𝑠% +	𝜌S𝓏%34 +	𝜀% 
 
where 𝜀% follows a normal distribution.  
The predicted probability of a given ordinal policy outcome is computed using the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function.  
What is observed is the actual directional change of the monetary policy stance, which depends 






The ordered-probit model is estimated using the method of Maximum Likelihood, which stated 
heuristically, maximises the probability that the model is correct given the functional form and 
the observed values of the variables.  
In sum, the Probit model aims to describe the directional change of the monetary policy 
depending on the expected level of inflation, expected economic growth, the yields spread, and 
the lagged directional change of monetary policy.  
In the following section, I estimate the model, reporting the parameter estimates, and the 











I now present the results of the empirical ECB reaction function for different samples. Since it 
is not straightforward to interpret the magnitude of the coefficients in the Ordered-Probit 
regression, just their direction and significance, I further compute the marginal effects for each 
possible outcome.  
The ECB’s reaction function may have changed across the entirety of my sample. In order to 
capture possible regime changes, I report results for three time-periods: the full sample (2001-
2019), the pre-crisis period (2001-2008) and the pre-ZLB period (2001-2014). Therefore, I can 
understand which variables were or were not significant at different points in time.  
The choice of these two periods holds on Gerlach and Lewis (2014) research about the ECB’s 
reaction function. According to their findings, the empirical reaction function switched after 
the Great Financial Crisis, through which the Governing Council adopted a more aggressive 
strategy, and later, in the latter half of 2010. 
 
Table 1. Ordered Probit Estimates of ECB Reaction Function 
 
Notes: Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower are bold-faced. z-
statistics are in parentheses. Probit estimates use the Huber-White correction. The Pseudo-R2 
is analogous to the R2 reported in linear regression models. The LR statistic on the overall 
significance of the model tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are zero. They 
are all significant at the 5% level.  








































































The results from these Probit models (Table 1) support my view that projections at eight-
quarters ahead influence significantly the directional change of monetary policy decisions.  
Table 1 shows that the coefficients for inflation and growth projections at eight-quarters are 
significant and display the expected (positive) sign during the full sample, albeit being 
marginally significant for the period preceding the 2008 crisis.  
The positive sign indicates that when the difference between the inflation forecast and the target 
becomes large and positive, the probability of a tightening gets bigger. This result is in line with 
the typically assumed reaction function of Central Banks. The same reasoning applies for the 
coefficient on the GDP growth. When the difference between projections across consecutive 
quarters is large and positive, the probability of a monetary policy tightening increases. These 
results are similar to the ones found earlier by Cour-Thimann and Jung (2020). And corroborate 
the view that in pursuing price stability, the ECB has displayed a forward-looking behaviour.  
The results on the four-quarters ahead projections both for inflation and GDP growth 
corroborate my initial hypothesis. Given the lag between monetary policy decisions and their 
effect into the economy, the Governing Council does not expect to change the four-quarters 
projection by adopting new measures. The coefficients on these two variables are not 
statistically different from zero. This result holds for two of the three periods studied.  
I now turn to the role of yield spreads on the reaction function of the ECB. Contrarily to my 
initial suggestion, and according to my results, the inclusion of yield spreads shows no 
significant effect on the ECB’s decision. This result is robust for the three different time-frames.  
After the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), yields on the 10-year government 
bonds for Germany and Southern European countries converged remarkably. Even though the 
spread between these two assets persisted, as the result of small differentials in fundamental 
risk (Pagano et al. 2004), it was not limiting nor affecting the mechanism of monetary policy 
transmission. Spreads only became a concern following the Great Financial Crisis. Investors 
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distrusted the ability of Southern European Countries to pay their mounting levels of debt, 
contributing to a self-fulfilling prophecy, and jeopardizing the mechanism of monetary policy 
transmission. The announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions in 2012, Assets 
Purchase Programmes and other unconventional instruments were key in solving the latter, but 
there were other episodes regarding Portugal and Italy, in which the ECB did not take any 
action. Their reluctance in acting in such situations may be the reason why the coefficient on 
yield spreads is not significant. Even though our results seem to indicate that there is no second 
mandate, we are not able to claim with certainty such result. Further research should be done 
on that matter.  
The results on the lagged change of monetary policy provide a rebuttal for previous studies. 
These do not confirm my hypothesis of a smoothing behaviour when deciding on the monetary 
policy stance. I was expecting the sign of this coefficient to be negative, implying that it is less 
likely that a central bank changes the direction of its monetary policy stance at two consecutive 
meetings. However, the sign on this variable was positive and significant at 5%, for all three 
time-periods. This may be the result of the Governing Council’s past decisions. Once this period 
of continuously easing the monetary policy stance is reverted, a period of gradually tightening 
the monetary policy stance is expected. 
I now turn to the marginal effects of my ordered-probit regression. Marginal effects show the 
change in probability when the independent variables increase by a unit point. By computing 
these I have an idea on how much does each variable contribute to the directional change of 
ECB’s monetary policy stance.  
Below, in table 2, you may find the results for two of the three possible outcomes: easing and 
tightening. For this latter outcome, I present five different settings. One at which all independent 
variables, except for the lagged monetary policy change which is equal to three, are at their 
mean values. A second one in which all independent variables are at their mean values, except 
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for the lagged monetary policy change and the projected GDP growth at eight quarters, which 
are equal to three and zero, respectively. An additional scenario, quite similar to the one 
previously stated, but at which the projected GDP growth at eight quarters is equal to 0.1. The 
last two scenarios compare probabilities when, conditional on the monetary policy stance 
having not been changed in the previous meeting, inflation projections improve from 0 to 0.1 
percentage points.  
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Notes: Marginal effects for the outcome “easing” are computed at the means of the independent 
variables, except for the lag on the monetary policy change which is equal to one. Marginal 
effects for the outcome “tightening” are computed for five different settings. Coefficients that 




Results, in table 2, show that the change between output projections, at eight-quarters time, is 
always statistically significant, regardless of the scenario chosen. On the contrary, the 
coefficients on inflation projections are not always statistically significant. Additionally, by 
looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, it becomes clear that output growth projections 
seem to hold the largest weight in what regards monetary policy decisions. This result 
contradicts our initial suggestion of inflation being ECB’s major concern. Their consistent 
concern in having projections always below, but close to two percent, for the past six years, 
seemed to indicate that the ECB was solely concerned with inflation. But these results provide 
a rebuttal for such statement.  
I am now focusing on the last four rows in table 2 above. There is a first scenario in which we 
compare the probability of tightening when output projections improve from 0 to 0.1 percentage 
points, conditional on the previous decision having been tightening. Results state that the 
probability of tightening increases by 10 percentage points, when output projections improve.  
The second scenario compares the probability of tightening when inflation projections improve 
from 0 to 0.1 percentage points, conditional on the monetary policy stance having not been 
changed in the previous meeting. As we can see, as inflation projections improve from 0 to 0.1 
percentage points, the probability of tightening increases by 3 percentage points.  
I present four additional scenarios in the appendix (table 4), concerning the probability of 
easing. Those four scenarios are all conditional on the previous decision having been not 
changing the monetary policy stance. Then, I compare the difference in probabilities if inflation 
projections deteriorate by 0.1 percentage points, and if output growth projections deteriorate by 
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the same amount. Results show that, if inflation projections deteriorate, the probability of easing 
increases by 2 percentage points. Furthermore, if output growth projections deteriorate, the 
probability of easing increases by 6 percentage points. Once again, output projections seem to 
be the most significant variable, and to hold the largest weight in what concerns ECB’s 
monetary policy decisions.  
Summing up, results on the direction and significance of the coefficients confirm previous 
studies on the reaction function of the ECB. When projections for both inflation and output 
improve, the ECB is more likely to tighten the monetary policy stance. Also, coefficients on 
yield spreads were not significant at any of the three time-frames studied. The reasoning behind 
such result may lay on the reluctance of ECB in acting in situations involving Portugal and 
Italy. However, more research should be done on this matter, in order to evaluate whether the 
ECB has or has not a dual mandate. Data is quite limited, given that unconventional instruments 
were only introduced following the Great Financial Crisis. Lastly, the marginal effects for 
different outcomes indicate that GDP growth projections seem to hold the largest weight in 
monetary policy decision making. Such result helps to answer one of my research questions, 
on whether the ECB was solely focused on inflation, or was inflation the most important 











In this research, the monetary policy reaction function of the ECB is estimated for three 
different time frames, in order to capture possible differences in ECB’s decision making, 
throughout the last 19 years. I resort to an ordered-probit model given the discrete behaviour of 
monetary policy decisions. Furthermore, given that interest-rate setting is no longer the only 
monetary policy instrument used by CBs, and there is no commonly accepted way to convert 
APP or Forward Guidance into interest rates, I only focus on the directional change of monetary 
policy decisions.  
Results confirm ECB’s forward-looking behaviour. Changes in the monetary policy direction 
seem to respond to staff projections both for inflation and output at eight-quarters time. 
Projections at four-quarters time seem to not be as important in decision making. Also, given 
that I use headline inflation, and this latter is subject to a lot of volatility, it is not expectable 
that the ECB responds to each single forecasts’ deviation from the target.  
Results do not confirm the existence of a second mandate of financial stability. Coefficients on 
yield spreads are not statistically significant at any time-frame. The use of unconventional 
programmes, albeit being key in guaranteeing financial markets’ stability, seems to be aiming 
at price stability.  
Finally, I analyse ECB’s forecasting errors, and conclude that their projections have been 
consistently biased for the last six years. This could be the result of ECB being solely focused 
on inflation, but only in public communication. In fact, results on marginal effects, do not 
confirm that the ECB’s sole focus is on inflation. On the contrary, GDP growth projections hold 
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Figure 5 - Forecasting Error Decomposition (Sweden), 2001-19 Figure 6 - Forecasting Error Decomposition (Canada), 2001-19 


















Figure 9 - Monetary Policy Decisions, quarterly (2001 – 2019) 
Figure 8 - Main ECB rates and EONIA rate 
Source: ECB  
	 28	
Table 3. Description of the Dataset   
 
Table 4. Marginal Effects  
Variable Source and Description 
Interest rates: 
- MRO rate 
- DFR 
ECB statistics (Statistical Data Warehouse) 
- FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.MRR_MBR.LEV 
- FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.DFR.LEV 
ECB staff forecasts  
(for inflation and growth) 
Hand collected from the ECB website (real-time) 
GDP for Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain 




- Germany 10-year government 
bonds  
- Italy 10-year government bonds 
- Ireland 10-year government 
bonds  
- Spain 10-year government bonds 
- Portugal 10-year government 
bonds 
 






























(at means, unless 
stated otherwise)  
𝒅𝒚
𝒅𝒙 
Easing 
∆𝑦%-/
) = 0	
-0.12 
(-1.61) 
-0.21 
(-1.81) 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
-0.49 
(-3.18) 
0.02 
(0.72) 
-0.12 
(-2.53) 
0.09 
 
𝒅𝒚
𝒅𝒙 
Easing 
∆𝑦%-/
) = −	0.1	
-0.17 
(-1.66) 
-0.31 
(-1.93) 
-0.04 
(-0.21) 
-0.71 
(-3.17) 
0.02 
(0.74) 
-0.17 
(-2.70) 0.15 
𝒅𝒚
𝒅𝒙 
Easing 
∆𝜋%-/
) = 0	
-0.09 
(-1.07) 
-0.17 
(-2.98) 
-0.02 
(-0.21) 
-0.39 
(-1.70) 
0.01 
(0.66) 
-0.09 
(-1.58) 0.07 
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𝒅𝒚
𝒅𝒙 
Easing 
∆𝜋%-/
) = −	0.1	
-0.11 
(-1.21) 
-0.21 
(-2.85) 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
-0.47 
(-2.07) 
0.01 
(0.69) 
-0.11 
(-1.89) 0.09 
